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Abstract
While they use the language of game theory known measures of a
priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations as-
suming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised
indices we show that rational players would behave differently from
the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strate-
gic behaviour.
Keywords and phrases: Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index, a
priori voting power, rational players.
1 Introduction
Since Shapley and Shubik (1954) adopted the Shapley value to measure a
priori voting power game theory has contributed an enormous literature to
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hospitality of the Economic Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in
the summer 2005.
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this topic: established theoretical underpinnings for the existing or rediscov-
ered indices, introduced new ones, but the plethora of power indices hints
that there is no single best. What is best depends on the institutional details
concerning the voting that cannot be captured by the voting game the index
is applied to (Laruelle, 1999). Whether one is more interested in comparing
powers of different players in the same game or the powers of the same player
in different games is one crucial choice. Since we are more interested in the
first we focus on normalised indices.
Game theory embraced power indices despite the fact that none of the
power indices are really “game theoretical.” Voting situations are games
where “the acquisition of power is the payoff” (Shapley, 1962, p. 59.), but
‘acquisition’ is an overstatement as players have no strategies: it seems vot-
ing indices are hardly more than statistical measures of the voters’ random
behaviour. We like to believe that this is not a realistic model of most voting
situations; we assume that voters are rational who can and want to influence
(that is: maximise) their power.
Motivated by the paradox of quarrelling members (Brams, 2003) we ex-
tend voting games to strategic voting games where players can choose which
coalitions are they willing to join. We show that all known normalised indices
are affected by such strategic behaviour.
Our paper is not the first to disallow certain (winning) coalitions in values
or power indices. Aumann and Dre`ze (1975) assume that property rights may
make it impossible to form every coalition. Owen (1977, 1982) assume that
coalitions are formed exactly in order to increase power. Myerson (1977,
1980) presents a model where players communicate via conferences and not
all conferences may occur Faigle and Kern (1992). The application of such
restrictions to power indices are more recent (Bilbao, Jime´nez, and Lo´pez,
1998).
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with a brief introduction
to voting games and an overview of the known indices. We briefly explain the
paradox of quarrelling members, introduce a framework for strategic indices
and prove some properties.
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2 Power indices
A voting situation is completely determined by (N,W), where N is the set of
voters and W denotes the set of winning coalitions. We study simple voting
games, that is, games, where
1. ∅ /∈ W ,
2. N ∈ W , and
3. if C ⊂ D ⊂ N and C ∈ W then D ∈ W .
Later the last two conditions will only be applied to the initial set of
winning coalitions.
A simple voting game is proper if we exclude the possibility for a motion
as well as its opposite being approved simultaneously; formally:
4. If S ∈ W and T ∈ W then S ∩ T 6= ∅.
Let Γ denote the collection of proper voting games.
LetM denote the set of minimal winning coalitions : the set of coalitions
for which no proper subset is a winning coalition. Formally: if S ∈ M and
i ∈ S, then S \ {i} /∈ W . Clearly M⊆W .
In this paper we motivate our examples by weighted voting games. Here N
is a collection of n interest groups, or parties having w1, w2, . . . , wn individual
representatives (wi ∈ R+). Let w =
∑n
i=1wi. We assume that a quota of
w ≥ q > w/2 is required to pass a bill. Representatives of a party cast the
same vote and therefore the game is a weighted voting game. For more on
weighted voting games see Straffin (1994).
The function κ given by
κ : Γ −→ RN (2.1)
(N,W) 7−→ (κi)i∈N , (2.2)
is a power measure. A power measure κ is a power index if
∑
i∈N κi = 1.
In the following we explain some of the well-known indices.
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The Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) is an application
of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) to measure voting power, motivated by
the story that parties throw their support at a motion in some order until a
winning coalition is reached. The last, pivotal party gets all the credit; the
Shapley-Shubik index is then the proportion of orderings where it is pivotal
φi =
# times i is pivotal
n!
.
The Banzhaf measure (Penrose, 1946; Banzhaf, 1965) is the probability
that a party is critical for a coalition, that is, the probability that it can turn
winning coalitions into losing ones.
ψi =
# times i is critical
2n−1
.
The Banzhaf index β (Coleman, 1971) is the Banzhaf measure normalised
to 1 – already in the spirit of the Shapley-Shubik index.
There are a few variants of the (normalised) Banzhaf index. In the John-
ston index γ (Johnston, 1978) the credit a critical player gets is inversely
proportional to the number of critical players in the coalition. In effect,
coalitions of different sizes have the same contribution to the distribution
of power. The Deegan-Packel index ρ (Deegan and Packel, 1978) is a fur-
ther modification that only considers minimal winning coalitions, motivated
by the idea that only minimal winning coalitions should form so that the
benefits from winning should be least divided (Riker, 1962). Finally the
Holler-Packel or Public Good Index h (Holler and Packel, 1983) modifies the
Deegan-Packel index: here the benefit of forming a winning coalition is given
to each and every player in the coalition. With the normalisation in sim-
ple games the index is nothing but a normalised Banzhaf index, where only
minimal coalitions are taken into account.
3 Strategic voting
All existing indices assume an exogenously given set of winning coalitions
and that players join winning coalitions at all times. This seems indeed
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natural – why would players give up part of their power? If for instance
two players start to “quarrel” and refuse to cooperate making any coalition
they both belong to losing their power should decrease. Not necessarily. The
“Paradox of Quarrelling Members” (Kilgour, 1974; Brams, 2003) arises when
two players benefit from refusing to cooperate with each other.
Whether this is truly paradoxical is subject to a debate, what matters for
us is that players can acquire power by approving/rejecting certain coalitions.
In this paper we extend voting games to allow for such strategic considera-
tions and define strategic power indices.
Consider the following game.
Example 1. The game G1 consists of four players represented by their
weights1: 31, 32, 21, 22 and voting has a quota of 6. The winning coalitions are
the following: W = {3132, 313221, 313222, 312122, 322122, 31322122}. (Critical
players are underlined.) Given this set we can calculate the Banzhaf index
β =
{
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
6
, 1
6
}
. Notice that in coalition 313221 player 21 is not critical;
suppose 21 rejects participation in this coalition. The recalculated Banzhaf
index for W ′ = {3132, 313222, 312122, 322122, 31322122} is β′ = { 310 , 310 , 15 , 15}.
Player 21’s rejection increased its relative power. It is therefore not in player
21’s interest to join every winning coalition it is invited to. This finding is
not really surprising. In coalition 313221 player 21 assisted players 31 and 32
in forming a winning coalition, but without getting any credit for it.
Minimal winning coalitions may also be subject to blocks:
Example 2. G2 is a 9-player game with players 51, 52, 53, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
and a quota of 11. Here M = {515253, 5i5j1k, 5i111213141516}, where k ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let W =M. Then the Banzhaf index is
given by β =
{
7
39
, 7
39
, 7
39
, 1
13
, 1
13
, 1
13
, 1
13
, 1
13
, 1
13
}
.
Now considerW ′ = {515253, 5i5j1k, 5l111213141516}, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and l ∈ {2, 3}. Then β′ = {13
71
, 14
71
, 14
71
, 5
71
, 5
71
, 5
71
, 5
71
, 5
71
, 5
71
}
. The
set W ′ does not contain the minimal winning coalition 51111213141516, yet
the critical player 51 is better off as
13
71
> 7
39
.
1Subscripts are used to distinguish players with identical weights from each other.
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While the aforementioned indices claim to measure power, it seems, play-
ers have actually little power to influence their power: hence they are no
more than probabilistic values. The paradox of quarrelling members as well
as the above examples illustrate that players can increase their power by
refusing to participate in certain coalitions. If a player credibly refuses to
participate in a coalition neither him nor his colleagues should get credit for
being critical to a coalition that never forms.
3.1 General model
The idea of quarrelling is generalised to coalitions: a coalition C is blocked
if the subset Q ⊆ C quarrels.
Definition 1. Player i’s strategy si describes subsets of players i wants to
quarrel with. Formally si ⊆ 2N\{i} such that if C,D ∈ si then C * D
(otherwise quarrelling with C implies quarrelling with D).
Player i’s strategy space Si collects its voting strategies, s = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}
is a particular strategy profile and S =
∏
i∈N Si the strategy space.
Definition 2 (Strategic voting game). A quadruple (N,W , S, κ) consisting
of a set of players N , a collection of initial winning coalitions W , a strategy
space S and a power index κ is called a strategic voting game.
Players noncooperatively accept/reject coalitions. Given strategies s the set
of winning coalitions W(s) is the quarrel-free subset:
W(s) = {w ∈ W| c * w ∀c ∈ si, ∀i ∈ N} . (3.1)
A quarrel is for good: we must think of an offence that “burns” the possibility
to reconvene. Subsets of a blocked coalition may form without restrictions.
Players maximise their payoff, given by their power κ(s) = κ(N,W(s)).
A strategic power index is then given by κ(N,W(s∗)), where s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium: for all i ∈ N and all si ⊆ s∗i , si ∈ Si we have κi(s∗) ≥ κi(si, s∗−i).
Such a strategic power index always exists (W(s∗) = ∅ is an equilibrium)
but is generally not unique. In the sequel we provide a unique refinement for
certain indices.
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3.2 Properties
The first group of results applies to all indices discussed in Section 2. Such
indices give no credit to non-critical or surplus players and give the same
credit to all critical (or swing) players within a coalition. The differences are
mostly in giving different winning coalitions C different weights aC , where∑
C∈W a
C = 1 and aC = 0 for coalitions containing surplus players only.
A power index κ(N,W) can be written as
κi =
∑
C∈W
aCµCi , where (3.2)
µCi =
 1kC if i is critical0 otherwise. (3.3)
is the credit player i gets for being in the coalition if the number of critical
players is kC (therefore
∑
i∈C µ
C
i = 1). For instance for the normalised
Banzhaf index aC = k
C
K
, where K =
∑
C∈W k
C .
Blocking a coalition B affects a player in two ways. On the one hand for
all C ⊇ B the coalition’s weight becomes (aC)′ = 0 and hence the player
loses
∑
C⊇B a
CµCi , on the other hand, due to the normalisation the weight of
other coalitions increases, and hence the credit it gets from other coalitions
is scaled up by ∑
C∈W a
C
(
∑
C∈W a
C)− (∑C⊇B aC) . (3.4)
Null players do not benefit from this, and remain null in strategic indices.
For this reason they will be ignored in our analysis.
Proposition 3. Surplus coalitions containing critical players are blocked.
Proof. Consider a coalition B containing a surplus player i. If i is not critical
in B, it is also not critical in C ⊃ B (as, by monotonicity if B\{i} is winning,
so is C\{i} ⊃ B\{i}) and therefore µCi = 0 for all C ⊇ B. On the other hand
for all C with aC > 0 there are other players that are critical, and so when
blocking B the power of player i is scaled up according to Expression 3.4
making the block profitable.
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Corollary 4. For power indices we have M⊇W∗.
Note, however that not all minimal coalitions survive as our Example 2
has already illustrated.
3.3 Equilibrium selection
In the following we study indices that are based on the set of minimal winning
coalitions rather than on all winning coalitions. Holler and Packel (1983)
argue that “since a non-critical member is not decisive for the winning of his
preferred coalition, i.e. his preferred policy, he has no incentive to vote.
. . . [This] does not imply that only these coalitions will form. It merely
suggest that only these coalitions should be considered for measuring a priori
voting power” (Holler and Packel, 1983, p. 24.). Two points are to be noted:
Firstly, only those coalitions should count where all players are positively
interested in joining. Secondly, this should not exclude the possibility of
other coalitions forming, however, no player should count on the formation
of other coalitions, as that will not be due to his or her power. A similar
prediction is made by aspiration solution concepts (Bennett, 1983, p. 15.).
By the definition of blocking it is clear thatW = ∅ is a Nash-equilibrium,
while it is clear that this is neither the only equilibrium nor the one we want
(not the least because power indices are undefined here). In general there
are many Nash equilibria and in the following we make a selection of these.
We take a conservative approach in two ways: (i) While we do not insist on
players to select the most profitable block, we do on one thing: if the block
of a superset of the blocked coalition would yield a better improvement then
we assume that the player does not block quite so aggressively and goes for
the smaller block (quarrelling with a superset). (ii) We assume that players
are friendly, open to form a coalition unless there are good reasons to do
otherwise. The friendly set F is defined as follows:
W(s) ∈ F if
∀i ∈ N, si = ∅∃i ∈ N, ∃W(s′i, s−i) ∈ F , such that κi(s) > κi(s′i, s−i).
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We select friendly equilibria s∗, such thatW(s) ∈ F that are minimal for
inclusion. The equilibrium set of winning coalitions is W∗ =W(s∗) and the
strategic κ power index is defined as
κ∗ = κ(N,W∗).
Now observe that for minimal winning coalitions C 6= D we have neither
C ⊂ D norD ⊂ C, therefore by blocking C a player will not blockD and vice
versa. Therefore a player has the possibility to block each minimal winning
coalition separately and not in a larger block. As in general these minimal
winning coalitions may have different sizes and consequently different µCi
values for i, some will be more attractive than others. By our assumption
(i) players will first only block the worst coalition(s). (As the block increases
the player’s power, coalitions that have been unattractive before, remain
unattractive. Therefore in case there are several coalitions of the same size,
we may also assume that they are blocked one-by one.
In sum, our model can be reduced to players picking which coalitions
they do not want to form. This result makes it particularly easy to work
with coalitions rather than strategies. Then an equilibrium is simply W∗
instead of W(s∗).
Player i profitably blocks coalition B iff
κi(N,W \ {B}) > κi(N,W) (3.5)∑
C∈W a
C∑
C∈W a
C − aB
(∑
C∈W
aCµCi − aBµBi
)
>
∑
C∈W
aCµCi (3.6)
After some rearrangements we get∑
C∈W a
CµCi∑
C∈W a
C
= κi(N,W) > µBi , (3.7)
which gives the following result.
Lemma 5. A block by player i is profitable if and only if the blocked coalition
gives less credit to player i than the average credit it gets, that is, than its
power index.
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Proposition 3 can also be seen as a corollary of this lemma.
Lemma 5 also suggests a relation to the theory of aspirations (Bennett,
1983), although this relation turns out to be superficial. In the theory of
aspirations it is not some coalition’s payoff that is bargained over: it is the
players that make their claims and unless their claims are satisfied certain
coalitions will or will not form. Here this claim is expressed by their power
index, the “credit they receive in general” and players demand the same
credit in coalitions. Unfortunately the link between the two concepts does
not go much beyond that. While a power index satisfies
∑
i∈N κ
∗
i = 1 a vector
of aspirations will almost always be larger. Bennett (1983, p. 15.) provides
the following example:
Example 3. A game with 5 players with weights 2, 2, 1, 1, and 1, and a
quota of 5. Here the unique partnered, balanced, equal gains aspiration is
(0.4, 0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2), while the public good index is h = ( 4
17
, 4
17
, 3
17
, 3
17
, 3
17
).
Now we move on to our main result.
Theorem 6. The friendly equilibrium is uniquely defined and is given by
W∗ =
⋂
w∈F
w. (3.8)
In order to prove this theorem we need some additional results.
Proposition 7. Let Ci, Cj ∈ W be coalitions that both contain both i and
j and such that i and j want to block Ci and Cj respectively. Then either i
wants to block Cj or j wants to block Ci.
Proof. Assume that the proposition is false. This means the following. Player
j blocks Cj, hence µ
Cj
j < κj(W). By our assumption i does not block,
hence µ
Cj
i ≥ κi(W). Therefore µCjj < µCji . Similarly i blocks Ci, hence
µCii < κi(W). By our assumption j does not block, hence µCij ≥ κj(W).
In sum µCii < µ
Cj
i and µ
Ci
j < µ
Cj
j . Since Ci and Cj are minimal coalitions
µCii = µ
Ci
j =
1
|Ci| and µ
Cj
j = µ
Cj
i =
1
|Cj | . Contradiction
Proposition 8. For all Wi,Wj ∈ F we have Wi ∩Wj ∈ F .
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the differences between Wi and Wj.
First we deal with the elementary step. AssumeWi = {A,C1, C2, . . . Cm},
Wj = {B,C1, C2, . . . Cm}, that is, the two sets only differ in 1 element each.
This ensures that their intersection is non-trivial. Wi andWj are descendants
of a common ancestorW0 = {A,B,C1, C2, . . . Cm}, but after blocking B and
A, respectively by some players i and j. The proposition merely states that
either blocking A is profitable from Wi or blocking B is profitable from Wj.
Wi is the result of blocking B by i. If j /∈ B then κj(W0) ≤ κj(Wi). We
know that j blocks A at W0 and hence κj(W0) > µAj . Hence κj(Wi) > µAj ,
which implies that j also blocks A at Wi. Thus Wij = {C1, C2, . . . Cm} ∈ F .
The symmetric case gives the corresponding result for i and B at Wj.
Finally we must consider the case where none of the previous two cases
applied, that is where j ∈ B and i ∈ A. As only a member can block a coali-
tion, we also have j ∈ A and i ∈ B. Therefore we can apply Proposition 7
to show that i blocks at Wj or j at Wi, which, as before, gives the result.
We have discussed all possible cases which completes the first part of the
proof. Now we move on to the general case. Assume that we have shown the
result for all pairs of sets with differences up to k − 1.
Now consider Wi = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak, C1, C2, . . . Cm} as well as Wj =
{B1, B2, . . . , Bl, C1, C2, . . . Cm}, where A1, A2, . . . , Ak and B1, B2, . . . , Bl rep-
resent the blocks that did not take place and l ≤ k. (Possibly Ap = Bq for
some p and q.) The question is whether this difference can be eliminated.
By definition if Wi ∈ F there exists a sequence of blocks starting from
W0 that lead to Wi and a similar sequence exists to Wj. Let W0i and W0j be
the first elements that are not common, without loss of generality, as results
of blocking B1 and A1 respectively. By the elementary step W1j =W0i ∩W0j
belongs to F .2 Now take the next set W2 along the path to Wi, W1i . By the
same argument W1i ∩ W1j also belongs to F . Repeating this argument we
travel parallel to the path and in the penultimate step we get Wpj ∈ F . For
the last time by the same argument Wi ∩Wpj = {A2, . . . , Ak, C1, C2, . . . Cm}
2Our notation is slightly misleading as W1j is not necessarily on the path to Wj , but
this should not lead to confusion.
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also belongs to F . If l < k, our inductive assumption can be used to complete
the proof.
In case l = k it is necessary to apply the same argument once more, but
on the other side: to show that {B2, . . . , Bl, C1, C2, . . . Cm} ∈ F .
Proof of Theorem. By Proposition 8 pairwise intersections of elements of F
also belong to F . As the number of winning coalitions is finite the result on
pairwise intersections implies that W∗ as defined in Equation 3.8 belongs to
F . Clearly W∗ ⊆ w for all w ∈ F . Therefore W∗ is the smallest friendly set
and it is trivially an equilibrium.
Corollary 9. The strategic power index κ∗ is well-defined.
4 Conclusion
We have developed a model that measures power taking the rational, utility
maximising behaviour of players into account. We have also shown that
none of the well-known power indices account for this behaviour. It appears
that these supposedly game theoretic concepts are not more than statistical
measures of random behaviour.
There are at least two possibilities to resolve this conflict. The one we
chose is to modify existing power indices so that no credit is given for coali-
tions that do not form. The advantage of this solution is that it is directly
motivated by the problem and gives a perfect answer to it without affecting
the concepts a great deal.
While this is the option we choose here there is an interesting alternative.
Observe that blocking a winning coalition may be advantageous to some
players, but it will hurt others in the coalition. The only players whose
power will surely increase are those outside the coalition. This indicates that
overall members of the coalition loose by not forming the coalition. Hence
forming the coalition increases the power of the members and therefore there
exists distributions of this power that benefit all members. Giving room for
renegotiation would lead us to cooperative, probably set-like solutions and
would make us lose the advantages of a single-point solution concept.
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Two other choices we have made are to assume that blocking coalition
C also blocks D ⊃ C and to work with power indices defined over minimal
winning coalitions only. Blocking single coalitions would not preserve null
players who could gain power for “mediation” (turning a blocked coalition
into a winning one by their entry – of course this coalition would be blocked
soon, too) and would allow non-minimal winning coalitions that are not
surplus coalitions as they would only consist of critical players. While our
original model considered a variant of this alternative, in order to avoid
such odd phenomena one has to separate the notions of winning a feasible
coalition.
Finally, the uniqueness of the friendly equilibrium for power indices also
looking at surplus coalitions remains an open problem. With the aforemen-
tioned model counterexamples can be presented here a systematic search for
them was in vain, now we believe the result to hold, but the present proof
does not directly extend to those indices.
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